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Allied propaganda images of the Second World War frequently
depicted Japan’s Emperor Hirohito alongside Germany’s Adolf
Hitler and Italy’s Benito Mussolini as—quite rightly—one of
the three leaders of the Axis powers,1 but as Noriko Kawamura,
associate professor of history at Washington State University, points
out in the introduction to her Emperor Hirohito and the Pacific War,
the Japanese monarch was anything but a dictator with absolute
power over his country. The wording of the Meiji constitution of
1889 allowed widely divergent interpretations of the role of the
emperor within the Japanese state, pitting ultranationalists and
militarists, particularly in the army, who insisted that the position
be understood as that of a divine sovereign with absolute powers,
against moderates, including Hirohito himself, who favoured the
British model of a purely ceremonial monarch. Until the issue
was definitively settled postwar with the emperor’s speech of 1
January 1946 renouncing his divinity, followed by the Americanimposed democratic constitution of 1947, the tension between these
two views of imperial sovereignty was never satisfactorily resolved.
The resultant ambiguity can perhaps best be seen in the fact that
while the emperor was unable to prevent the initiation of hostilities
against Britain and the United States in December 1941, he was
able, through the issuance of a seidan (sacred imperial decision), to
compel the surrender of Japanese forces in August 1945.
With a possible view to prosecuting Hirohito for war crimes—
until the idea was dropped in the spring of 1946—the American
occupation authorities were naturally very interested in the question
of why, if the emperor had the power to end the war, did he not
stop his nation from going to war in the first place? In this book,
the stated intention of the author is to examine the reverse of this

See, for example, the front cover of the US Army instructional booklet Two Down
and One to Go by the illustrator and caricaturist Arthur Szyk, noteworthy for
its avoidance of the extravagantly grotesque Asiatic features found in so much of
the imagery of this period. War Department, Two Down and One to Go, War
Department Pamphlet No. 21-31 (Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office,
1945). The front cover alone can be found at https://commons.wikimedia.org/
wiki/File:Arthur_Szyk_(1894-1951)._Two_Down_and_One_to_Go_pamphlet_
(1945),_Washington_DC.jpg.
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question; namely, if the emperor could not prevent the inexorable
slide to war in 1941, how was he able to end hostilities in 1945? But
this proves to be a distinction without a difference. In a compact
work of fewer than two hundred pages of main text, comprising an
introduction, six chapters arranged chronologically, and an epilogue,
Kawamura devotes just as much attention to decision-making at the
highest levels in the period leading up to the attacks on Malaya
and Pearl Harbor as she does to the epoch-making events leading to
the surrender. Beginning her narrative in the aftermath of the 1919
Paris Peace Conference to provide essential geopolitical context, the
author expends considerable effort elucidating the complex web of
relationships between the three centres of power in Japan at the time,
comprising the emperor and his advisors, the prime minister and
his cabinet, and the commanders of the army and navy. With many
illustrative examples and not-infrequent repetition of key points, the
novice reader should have a good understanding of the workings of
this system by the time, on page 110, the country is at war with the
Western powers.
Among the many interesting themes explored in this book, the
relations between the imperial court and the high command of the
military—governed, as they were, by a supreme irony—deserve
special mention. Among the strongest supporters of the view that the
emperor was to be seen as an absolute monarch, an incarnate divinity
beyond the reach of the state, was a powerful faction of militant
ultranationalists in the army. Yet for all their belief in the authority of
the emperor, Hirohito’s own preference for a constitutional monarchy
meant nothing to them. As he complained to his naval aide-de-camp
in May 1935, “Don’t you think the army is contradicting itself by
advocating the theory of imperial sovereignty against my wishes?”
(p. 58). Similarly, Hirohito’s oft-stated desire for an early cessation of
hostilities in China posed little obstacle to the continued expansion
of conflict on the Asian mainland, his voice largely ignored by the
army. As he told his military aide-de-camp in April 1935, “When
the Manchurian Incident broke out … The army would not provide
me with the information I sought from the cabinet … Why does the
army prevent me from gaining information that I require for my
own reference?” (p. 57). By 1945, though, the situation was very
different. Defeat after defeat had strengthened the hand of a growing
peace faction among the emperor’s advisors, the government, and
the military, particularly in the navy. As early as March of that
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year, discussions began in secrecy to lay the groundwork for a seidan
scenario, whereby the emperor would conclude the war through a
sacred pronouncement. After the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, the
Soviet entry into the war against Japan, and the bombing of Nagasaki,
the time was judged to be right. When the emperor issued his famous
seidan of 14 August advocating surrender, the leaders of the army,
long inculcated with the virtue of obeying the imperial will without
fail, were now trapped in their own logic, and with the exception of
a few hardliners who were swiftly dealt with, an orderly surrender
of Japanese forces ensued. We will never know, of course, what the
result would have been had the emperor employed the device of the
seidan with the intention of preventing war in the autumn of 1941.
Although the author engages with previous English-language
scholarship on this subject, her references to these works are to
be found mostly in the introduction and epilogue. Her sources for
the narrative chapters, on the other hand, consist almost entirely
of primary material in Japanese, as is only to be expected from a
scholarly work. But because the Japanese in 1945 had a number of days
between the surrender and the arrival of the first occupation forces
to burn whatever documents they could, very few of these sources
are in fact archival, consisting instead mainly of published memoirs
and diaries of those close to Hirohito during the events examined
here.2 That being said, documents of potentially great importance
are suspected by some to still reside in the imperial archives, but
the Imperial Household Agency will not discuss what material of
this type may have survived. Until public access is granted to these
documents—assuming they even exist—the sources consulted by
Kawamura remain the best available.
The main point of originality in the present volume would probably
have to be Kawamura’s detailed account of the manoeuvrings of the
peace faction in the lead-up to the 14 August seidan, as well as the
importance she attaches to their efforts, arguing that the atomic
bombings and the Soviet declaration of war would not have led directly
to Japan’s surrender on their own. But by no means is she the first to
discuss the intrigues of the peace faction—that goes back at least as

The reader who consults every endnote will find the experience very different from
reading similar works on Nazi Germany, which can have a veritable alphabet soup of
abbreviations for the numerous archives that may have been consulted.
2  

8

Book Reviews

far as 1954 with Robert Butow’s Japan’s Decision to Surrender 3—
and the explanations she provides of precisely how her interpretations
differ from previous scholarship, argued at length on pages 152-4,
are exceedingly subtle. Nevertheless, exclusive of general biographies
of Hirohito, Kawamura’s monograph is the first in English, as far as
I am aware, to examine the role of Hirohito in the decision-making
for both war and peace; previous works have dealt with either one
period or the other.4 Moreover, as one of the most recent books in
English on any aspect of Hirohito’s reign, members of the academic
community at any level with an interest in this subject, particularly
those without Japanese-language skills, will not be able to ignore
this volume. Purists may complain that the exclusive reliance on
the Roman alphabet makes it harder, rather than easier, to locate
Japanese-language sources listed in the bibliography, but this should
only be a concern to a minority of prospective readers. The index,
moreover, functions in part as a glossary, helpfully providing an
English translation of the few Japanese terms that, because of their
importance, are given in the original in the text. Dealing primarily
with events at the political, grand strategic, and strategic levels of
analysis, the narrative contains only the most important toponyms,
which are easily accommodated (for the most part) on the single
map. With a spare but clear writing style, the author gets straight
to the point and almost always stays there, which no doubt helps
explain her ability to cover so much material in such a short book. In
particular, the non-specialist with an understanding of the workings
of European dictatorships of the period is encouraged to engage with
this intelligent, tightly focused account of a governmental system
that, regardless of what Allied propaganda may have implied at the
time, bore no more than an outward resemblance to those of Japan’s
Axis partners.
brian bertosa , independent researcher
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